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Thread: Nuclear power

  1. #61
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    David talked about this long before we did...

    Psalms 62:9

    Surely men of low degree are a vapor,
    Men of high degree are a lie;
    If they are weighed on the scales,
    They are altogether lighter than vapor.
    Ephesians 2 : 8-9



    Charles Barkley: Nobody doesn't like meat.

  2. #62
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    The inherent problem is that some brains trust decided that they could perform something that hasn't been done in 35 years without knowing what it takes to build it. Most of the planning group was in diapers the last time this was done and all of the guys that built the last one have aged out. The project's success is predicated upon a group of people that are at an all time low. The group of people that they tried to recruit with high wages don't exist in the volume that was required to complete the project so they tried to train up the rest. It was a classic scenario of trying to make chicken salad out of chicken shit.

    Labor is and always will be the greatest liability on a jobsite. Throw in poor quality control (also labor related) and you have a recipe for disaster.

  3. #63
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    Quote Originally Posted by kquinn View Post
    The inherent problem is that some brains trust decided that they could perform something that hasn't been done in 35 years without knowing what it takes to build it. Most of the planning group was in diapers the last time this was done and all of the guys that built the last one have aged out. The project's success is predicated upon a group of people that are at an all time low. The group of people that they tried to recruit with high wages don't exist in the volume that was required to complete the project so they tried to train up the rest. It was a classic scenario of trying to make chicken salad out of chicken shit.

    Labor is and always will be the greatest liability on a jobsite. Throw in poor quality control (also labor related) and you have a recipe for disaster.
    This could be the most valuable post in this thread.

    However, I am watching Elon Musk landing space vehicles on a dock...

  4. #64
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    I don't care about a college degree. I judge someone on their work ethic. No matter what job, what shift, and what level pay. I've noticed that there are worthless people at all of them. I don't understand why we don't call them out and fire them. And tell their next employers that they were fired for being sorry.

    But everyone is worried about a lawsuit these days. Worried they will get sued for wrongful termination or for giving someone a bad review.

    The Japan reactors was the kiss of death for this project. No one wanted to be held responsible for a potential failure. So you end up with a management system that won't take action and that required layers and layers of red tape with subs of subs that is there purely for cya.
    Last edited by uga_dawg; 08-13-2017 at 09:24 AM.

  5. #65
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    Speaking of college degrees and the need thereof...

    When I was a student at MIT, professor Lambeau used to challenge his students by putting very difficult, graduate level math problems on his chalk board in hopes that one of his students would complete the problem by the end of the semester. To his surprise, one day he came back and it was completed the night before, but they couldn't figure out who solved it. Then, he put an even more challenging problem on the board (one that had personally taken him 2 years to solve), again it was solved overnight, but this time professor Lambeau actually caught the guy solving the problem, as he fled the scene. Turns out, it was just a blue collar JANITOR!!! You got that right. JANITOR, who just happened to be a self-taught genius. Turns out, he wasn't living up to his full potential and was much brighter than the college students!




    Wait never-mind... Now that I think of it, this might be from a movie that I saw a long time ago... I never went to MIT... Sorry for the confusion...

  6. #66
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    NRC is the problem. Always has been, always will be.

    The US Navy has been steady building nuclear plants since the 50's without a glitch.

  7. #67
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    Quote Originally Posted by Tater View Post
    NRC is the problem. Always has been, always will be.

    The US Navy has been steady building nuclear plants since the 50's without a glitch.
    My boy Blue...

  8. #68
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    Quote Originally Posted by JABIII View Post
    Are you seriously impugning the same banking industry that gave us Mack Whittle?
    That was awesome.

  9. #69
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    August 11, 2017

    SC Energy Crisis: Who Is Accountable?


    SC Energy Nuclear Reactor Failure

    The decision by Santee Cooper and SCANA (the parent company of SCE&G) to abandon a multi-billion joint project to build two nuclear power facilities means that their customers were not only charged billions of dollars to build plants that won’t be finished, but will also have to pay billions more – for decades to come – of debt on the projects.

    There are more questions than answers, and it will take some time to unravel the details of this decade-long debacle. What is undeniable is that not only has the energy monopoly in the state failed to the point of crisis, but the power monopoly in the Statehouse is entirely to blame for the catastrophic cost.

    The long-term solution is de-regulation of the energy monopoly. In fact, it’s becoming clear that opening up the energy market and getting politicians out of the utility business is the only way South Carolinians will avoid the high cost of paying off the debt for nuclear plants that will never supply power.

    Right now, angry citizens deserve serious and detailed answers about the cost, consequences, and who is accountable for both. Here’s a general overview.

    The Legislature and the Base Load Review Act

    The legislature passed a law that guaranteed ratepayers would bear the full cost to build the nuclear plant, including a profit for SCANA’s investors.

    This law effectively served as a guarantee that ratepayers would repay SCANA’s debt even if the project wasn’t finished.

    The South Carolina legislature passed the Base Load Review Act (BLRA) in 2007. This legislation:

    Allowed power companies to raise their rates in advance to pay for construction of nuclear or coal power plants. This forced ratepayers to become the project’s venture capitalists, bearing all the cost and the risk. SCANA raised rates for this project nine times over nine years.
    Guaranteed that even if the project were abandoned, the ratepayers would still absorb the cost of paying back the debt. This made power plant construction a no-lose proposition for the investor-backed SCANA and a safe bet for creditors.
    Allowed utilities to build a profit for their investors into the rate charge. Ratepayers were not only building the plants but paying investors before the plant began generating revenue.
    Allowed utilities to charge their ratepayers for the “preconstruction” costs that would be incurred before the plant was authorized.
    Lawmakers also included protections against pushback from regulators. While the BLRA does require the oversight of the Public Service Commission (PSC), the language is vague, undefined and was heavily weighted to favor utilities. For example, if a utility’s proposals and practices were “prudent and reasonable,” and any changes to the plan were just, reasonable or were not imprudent, the PSC is required to approve them.

    Furthermore, costs defined as “preconstruction” (evaluation, design, consulting, professional costs, etc.) could be included in the total cost prior to obtaining even preliminary approval.

    The PSC was required to authorize this unless it deemed the general decision to incur preconstruction costs to be imprudent – but not the actual preconstruction costs themselves. In other words, the individual financial decisions incurred in advance could not be specifically challenged and excluded. Once approved, those preconstruction costs – and the ongoing costs translated to the project – could not be challenged in any future hearings.

    Finally, while SCANA had to petition the PSC to authorize a rate increase, if the PSC failed to rule within four months and ten days the increase was automatically approved.

    The BLRA passed the House (104-6) and the Senate (which did not take a roll-call vote) and became law without the governor’s signature.

    Oversight by the Legislatively-Controlled Public Service Commission

    The Public Service Commission (PSC) was responsible for all decisions to approve SCANA’s project plan, changes, and rate hikes. The PSC is nominated and supervised by yet another board – the Public Utility Review Committee (PURC) – which is appointed by two legislative leaders: the Speaker of the House and the chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee.

    The PSC is a seven-member board created by state law to regulate public utilities. PSC members are full-time with salaries of more than $100,000 per year. The PSC has the statutory authority to approve utilities’ rates, service, and practices and is the oversight agency specified by law for nuclear/coal plant construction under the BLRA.

    The PSC had the statutory responsibility to approve SCANA’s nuclear construction plan, including:

    the original project schedule including contingencies,
    capital cost,
    desired rate hike,
    principal contractors, suppliers, etc.
    The PSC also had to approve every single modification of the project. In other words, any problems with cost or timeline would/should have been disclosed and approved.

    In other words, the PSC is entirely accountable for the approval of both the rate hikes and the details of SCANA’s project– including cost overruns and extended timelines. But the PSC is not accountable to the public. Rather, the commissioners are elected by the entire General Assembly but nominated – and supervised – by a board of legislators.

    Who controls the PSC? Meet the PURC

    The PURC is a special board chosen by two legislative leaders – and comprised mostly of legislators – that nominates candidates to the PSC. The PURC also supervises the PSC and reviews their performance.

    The PSC members are elected by the General Assembly, but they are nominated by the Public Utilities Review Committee (PURC). The PURC consists of six lawmakers and four members of the general public. The Senate Judiciary Chairman appoints five members, the Speaker of the House appoints four members, and the chairman of the House Labor, Commerce and Industry Committee automatically serves. All House committees elect their own chairmen, but committee members are selected by the speaker – giving him indirect influence over committee chairmen.

    The PURC screens and nominates up to three candidates for each of the seven PSC seats, and elections are staggered so that the General Assembly holds PSC elections every two years. It is worth nothing that legislators have not been inclined to replace the PSC members – three of the members have served since 2004, one since 2008, one since 2010, one since 2013 and the other since 2014.

    Four of the seven members have been on the Public Service Commission since the beginning of the nuclear project.

    The PURC is also charged with ongoing oversight of the PSC. State law requires the PURC to:

    conduct an annual performance review of each PSC member, as well as the PSC as a whole, and
    submit the reviews to the General Assembly and each PSC member’s file for reelection consideration.
    The Office of Regulatory Staff: the government advocate for the public

    The government agency charged with “representing the public” in proceedings governing the utility (e.g., rate hikes) is controlled by the same legislative board that supervises the PSC.

    Another agency – the Office of Regulatory Staff (ORS) – was created by state law to be the consumer advocate and represent the public interest before the PSC. The ORS has significant authority to audit and investigate during the BLRA process, at least on paper, and is charged with reviewing the “reasonableness and necessity of all costs to be recovered…” The ORS is specifically instructed by the BLRA to “safeguard the public interest.”

    Regardless of stated intent, however, the ORS is hardly an independent watchdog. In fact, while the governor technically appoints the executive director of the ORS, state law specifically instructs the PURC board to nominate no more than one candidate for the governor’s consideration. The PURC also sets the salaries of the ORS director and staff.

    The agency that regulates utilities and the agency that advocates for the public are, in effect, both controlled by the same handful of legislators.

    Santee Cooper and SCANA

    Santee Cooper can’t be held directly accountable by its customers, as it is a state agency controlled by a board. While that board is initially appointed by the governor, the nominees must be reviewed by the PURC before confirmation by the Senate. This adds yet another layer of control over the energy system by the same handful of legislators.

    The governor cannot remove board members unless they violate the law. Santee Cooper has the authority to borrow revenue bonds, which are guaranteed by their ratepayers, and currently has outstanding bond debt of more than $7 billion – almost seven times greater than the second-highest agency debt of the State Infrastructure Bank. An estimated $4 billion of that debt was borrowed for the failed nuclear project.

    Who can citizens hold accountable going forward?

    The General Assembly bears full responsibility to the public for the nuclear plant debacle.

    The General Assembly passed the law guaranteeing ratepayers would cover the project’s cost instead of the utility.
    The General Assembly elects the Public Service Commission (PSC) that regulates utilities and oversees the BLRA plant construction process.
    Legislators serve on the Public Utility Review Committee (PURC) that not only nominates the PSC but oversees its performance, and screens the board of state-owned utility Santee Cooper.
    There is only one place for citizens to go for answers – and action – on the nuclear plant debacle that puts them on the hook for billions of dollars, and that is to their own House member and senator. Ultimately lawmakers are accountable both for the legislation that led to the current energy crisis, and for the entire approval and oversight process. Lawmakers who defend their power monopoly cannot escape the blame for its failure.

  10. #70
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    Quote Originally Posted by Fish View Post
    August 11, 2017

    SC Energy Crisis: Who Is Accountable?


    SC Energy Nuclear Reactor Failure

    The decision by Santee Cooper and SCANA (the parent company of SCE&G) to abandon a multi-billion joint project to build two nuclear power facilities means that their customers were not only charged billions of dollars to build plants that won’t be finished, but will also have to pay billions more – for decades to come – of debt on the projects.

    There are more questions than answers, and it will take some time to unravel the details of this decade-long debacle. What is undeniable is that not only has the energy monopoly in the state failed to the point of crisis, but the power monopoly in the Statehouse is entirely to blame for the catastrophic cost.

    The long-term solution is de-regulation of the energy monopoly. In fact, it’s becoming clear that opening up the energy market and getting politicians out of the utility business is the only way South Carolinians will avoid the high cost of paying off the debt for nuclear plants that will never supply power.

    Right now, angry citizens deserve serious and detailed answers about the cost, consequences, and who is accountable for both. Here’s a general overview.

    The Legislature and the Base Load Review Act

    The legislature passed a law that guaranteed ratepayers would bear the full cost to build the nuclear plant, including a profit for SCANA’s investors.

    This law effectively served as a guarantee that ratepayers would repay SCANA’s debt even if the project wasn’t finished.

    The South Carolina legislature passed the Base Load Review Act (BLRA) in 2007. This legislation:

    Allowed power companies to raise their rates in advance to pay for construction of nuclear or coal power plants. This forced ratepayers to become the project’s venture capitalists, bearing all the cost and the risk. SCANA raised rates for this project nine times over nine years.
    Guaranteed that even if the project were abandoned, the ratepayers would still absorb the cost of paying back the debt. This made power plant construction a no-lose proposition for the investor-backed SCANA and a safe bet for creditors.
    Allowed utilities to build a profit for their investors into the rate charge. Ratepayers were not only building the plants but paying investors before the plant began generating revenue.
    Allowed utilities to charge their ratepayers for the “preconstruction” costs that would be incurred before the plant was authorized.
    Lawmakers also included protections against pushback from regulators. While the BLRA does require the oversight of the Public Service Commission (PSC), the language is vague, undefined and was heavily weighted to favor utilities. For example, if a utility’s proposals and practices were “prudent and reasonable,” and any changes to the plan were just, reasonable or were not imprudent, the PSC is required to approve them.

    Furthermore, costs defined as “preconstruction” (evaluation, design, consulting, professional costs, etc.) could be included in the total cost prior to obtaining even preliminary approval.

    The PSC was required to authorize this unless it deemed the general decision to incur preconstruction costs to be imprudent – but not the actual preconstruction costs themselves. In other words, the individual financial decisions incurred in advance could not be specifically challenged and excluded. Once approved, those preconstruction costs – and the ongoing costs translated to the project – could not be challenged in any future hearings.

    Finally, while SCANA had to petition the PSC to authorize a rate increase, if the PSC failed to rule within four months and ten days the increase was automatically approved.

    The BLRA passed the House (104-6) and the Senate (which did not take a roll-call vote) and became law without the governor’s signature.

    Oversight by the Legislatively-Controlled Public Service Commission

    The Public Service Commission (PSC) was responsible for all decisions to approve SCANA’s project plan, changes, and rate hikes. The PSC is nominated and supervised by yet another board – the Public Utility Review Committee (PURC) – which is appointed by two legislative leaders: the Speaker of the House and the chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee.

    The PSC is a seven-member board created by state law to regulate public utilities. PSC members are full-time with salaries of more than $100,000 per year. The PSC has the statutory authority to approve utilities’ rates, service, and practices and is the oversight agency specified by law for nuclear/coal plant construction under the BLRA.

    The PSC had the statutory responsibility to approve SCANA’s nuclear construction plan, including:

    the original project schedule including contingencies,
    capital cost,
    desired rate hike,
    principal contractors, suppliers, etc.
    The PSC also had to approve every single modification of the project. In other words, any problems with cost or timeline would/should have been disclosed and approved.

    In other words, the PSC is entirely accountable for the approval of both the rate hikes and the details of SCANA’s project– including cost overruns and extended timelines. But the PSC is not accountable to the public. Rather, the commissioners are elected by the entire General Assembly but nominated – and supervised – by a board of legislators.

    Who controls the PSC? Meet the PURC

    The PURC is a special board chosen by two legislative leaders – and comprised mostly of legislators – that nominates candidates to the PSC. The PURC also supervises the PSC and reviews their performance.

    The PSC members are elected by the General Assembly, but they are nominated by the Public Utilities Review Committee (PURC). The PURC consists of six lawmakers and four members of the general public. The Senate Judiciary Chairman appoints five members, the Speaker of the House appoints four members, and the chairman of the House Labor, Commerce and Industry Committee automatically serves. All House committees elect their own chairmen, but committee members are selected by the speaker – giving him indirect influence over committee chairmen.

    The PURC screens and nominates up to three candidates for each of the seven PSC seats, and elections are staggered so that the General Assembly holds PSC elections every two years. It is worth nothing that legislators have not been inclined to replace the PSC members – three of the members have served since 2004, one since 2008, one since 2010, one since 2013 and the other since 2014.

    Four of the seven members have been on the Public Service Commission since the beginning of the nuclear project.

    The PURC is also charged with ongoing oversight of the PSC. State law requires the PURC to:

    conduct an annual performance review of each PSC member, as well as the PSC as a whole, and
    submit the reviews to the General Assembly and each PSC member’s file for reelection consideration.
    The Office of Regulatory Staff: the government advocate for the public

    The government agency charged with “representing the public” in proceedings governing the utility (e.g., rate hikes) is controlled by the same legislative board that supervises the PSC.

    Another agency – the Office of Regulatory Staff (ORS) – was created by state law to be the consumer advocate and represent the public interest before the PSC. The ORS has significant authority to audit and investigate during the BLRA process, at least on paper, and is charged with reviewing the “reasonableness and necessity of all costs to be recovered…” The ORS is specifically instructed by the BLRA to “safeguard the public interest.”

    Regardless of stated intent, however, the ORS is hardly an independent watchdog. In fact, while the governor technically appoints the executive director of the ORS, state law specifically instructs the PURC board to nominate no more than one candidate for the governor’s consideration. The PURC also sets the salaries of the ORS director and staff.

    The agency that regulates utilities and the agency that advocates for the public are, in effect, both controlled by the same handful of legislators.

    Santee Cooper and SCANA

    Santee Cooper can’t be held directly accountable by its customers, as it is a state agency controlled by a board. While that board is initially appointed by the governor, the nominees must be reviewed by the PURC before confirmation by the Senate. This adds yet another layer of control over the energy system by the same handful of legislators.

    The governor cannot remove board members unless they violate the law. Santee Cooper has the authority to borrow revenue bonds, which are guaranteed by their ratepayers, and currently has outstanding bond debt of more than $7 billion – almost seven times greater than the second-highest agency debt of the State Infrastructure Bank. An estimated $4 billion of that debt was borrowed for the failed nuclear project.

    Who can citizens hold accountable going forward?

    The General Assembly bears full responsibility to the public for the nuclear plant debacle.

    The General Assembly passed the law guaranteeing ratepayers would cover the project’s cost instead of the utility.
    The General Assembly elects the Public Service Commission (PSC) that regulates utilities and oversees the BLRA plant construction process.
    Legislators serve on the Public Utility Review Committee (PURC) that not only nominates the PSC but oversees its performance, and screens the board of state-owned utility Santee Cooper.
    There is only one place for citizens to go for answers – and action – on the nuclear plant debacle that puts them on the hook for billions of dollars, and that is to their own House member and senator. Ultimately lawmakers are accountable both for the legislation that led to the current energy crisis, and for the entire approval and oversight process. Lawmakers who defend their power monopoly cannot escape the blame for its failure.

    This
    Last edited by bigtimeduckhunter; 08-15-2017 at 05:11 AM.

  11. #71
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    But DT and all of the Assembly / Senate said it wasn't "their responsibility" ....no accountability ZERO. I bet if he did a new "development" in Florence and the rolls were reversed he would be thinking differently
    “The price of freedom is eternal vigilance” - Thomas Jefferson

  12. #72
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    My op-ed in the Post and Courier this morning.

    Don’t Sell the Lakes

    Several years ago my two sons and I were driving to one of the Santee Cooper Lakes for a day of boating. I noticed a billboard on the side of the road and read it to my boys. It said, “Alfred Kelly sells the lake”. I told my young boys we may as well turn around because the lake was sold. I still remember their question in disbelief, “He can’t sell it can he Daddy”?

    By now I am sure most South Carolinians have heard about the financial and construction problems affecting the nuclear project in Fairfield County.
    SCE&G and Santee Cooper are partners in the project that ceased when the Westinghouse, the contractor, declared bankruptcy.

    In 2007 SCE&G lawyers drafted proposed legislation allowing power companies to recover the cost of new generation facilities before they were finished. Traditionally, power companies could not ask the Public Service Commission for rate increases until the plant was working. The cost to build a new generator is added into the rate you pay for electricity. The lobbyists said consumers would save money in the long run because they would not have to pay for the cost of bonds.

    Nearly the entire General Assembly voted for the legislation now known as the Base Load Review Act. As a freshman legislator I share some blame since I voted for it. I should have asked the lobbyists what the repercussions were if the project was not completed?

    What I have learned is the Act also shifted the risk to the consumer. The shift not only let shareholders off the hook, it rewarded cost overruns by increasing the book value of the company.

    Had the nuclear plant been completed on budget this legislation would have saved ratepayers hundreds of millions of dollars in interest payments. As we now know, the plant is not on budget and may never get finished.

    The legislature must added language to protect ratepayers against project failures. You should not have to pay for something you will never get benefit from. Affected ratepayers are justifiably angry and are demanding to know what happened.

    Most of the blame, I suspect, will fall on the contractor Westinghouse for failing to support the project during construction. Westinghouse will pay only a pittance through bankruptcy proceedings.

    SCE&G and Santee Cooper management should have exercised more scrutiny before paying for the increased cost associated with construction delays and cost overruns. The project was plagued by work stoppages, burdensome regulations, inconsistent quality, increased cost of labor and materials, and cost of debt. SCE&G shareholders must be held responsible for the failed project.

    No new nuclear units have been completed in the United States in 35 years. This means that the two incomplete units are a pivotal point for future development of nuclear energy in the United States. The failed projects may potentially cause the federal government to abandon nuclear energy as a carbon-free source of energy. A diversified energy portfolio is necessary for energy independence and for national security.

    Santee Cooper owned 45% of the nuclear project with SCE&G. It is important to understand Santee did not need the 2007 Base Load Review Act to raise rates. The Santee Cooper board has the unilateral right to set rates for the state-owned utility. Because Santee Cooper does not have shareholders they present a whole different set of problems caused by the failure and will require a different approach to solutions.

    At a minimum, Santee Cooper’s rates should be reviewed and approved by the South Carolina Public Service Commission, SCPSC. This politically appointed commission is staffed by career professionals with the skills and experience necessary to ensure rates are fair and reasonable.

    To ensure public confidence, the SCPSC’s handling of the recent nuclear rate requests should be reviewed to ensure that the commissions own internal policies were strictly followed and their decisions were not influenced from the outside. This review should also determine if the commission has the tools and staff necessary to provide on-going reviews of active projects. This state agency should be an active and integral part of preventing a reoccurrence of the existing problems.


    Reviewing Santee Cooper’s rate requests does not address the current situation. Being a non-profit, state-owned agency, Santee Cooper does not have shareholders to provide financial relief like SCE&G does. The state is responsible outstanding bonds. It is an uncomfortable reality that South Carolina must seriously consider selling Santee Cooper, a once valuable tool of economic development.


    Even with its tax-free and non-profit status, Santee Cooper’s rates have lost their competitive edge. However, selling Santee Cooper outright does not make their problem go away. There is a very real chance that the net value of Santee Cooper is under water, pun intended. This means the state may have to kick-in additional money just to take it off our hands. We must insure that rates do not rise with any proposal.

    It is likely that selling the individual pieces of Santee Cooper’s assets will yield the most value. The major assets are its distribution system and customer base, its mostly coal-based generation system, their share of the transmission grid and their property holdings. It is this last piece that concerns me most.

    Santee Cooper owns and manages Lake Marion and Moultrie. The five counties surrounding the two lakes generate more than $500 million annually in economic impact for South Carolina. Conversely, the hydroelectric generation from the lakes makes up just 2% of Santee’s total energy. This means the lakes are worth far more to South Carolina than the just hydroelectric generation.

    The recreational activities and bountiful natural resources of Lake Marion and Moultrie are what make South Carolina a great place to live. Even with Santee Cooper’s financial problems, we should not be so shortsighted as to allow these economically and environmentally valuable assets to be sold to the highest bidder. These resources must be owned and managed by the state.

    Getting back to my boys on the boating trip, I don’t want South Carolinians to look at me one day and ask in disbelief, why did they sell the lake? Our lakes should not be for sale.


    Representative Phillip Lowe
    Last edited by Duck Tape; 08-15-2017 at 06:37 AM.
    Either write things worth reading, or do things worth writing.

  13. #73
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    one might think the person writing that sees how fucked up our political system is...but I have my reservations.

    they came and put a gas line thru my PRIVATE PROPERTY to end at a PRIVATE COMPANY. That make sense?

    People paying for a nuclear plant before its complete with no recourse?

    You politicians aint real bright....and please dont respond with "when are you putting your name in the hat?"
    Ugh. Stupid people piss me off.

  14. #74
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    "My vote has not affected my constituents at all. " Philip Lowe defending his Yes vote for the BLRA, 08/10/17

    "Getting back to my boys on the boating trip, I don’t want South Carolinians to look at me one day and ask in disbelief, why did they sell the lake? Our lakes should not be for sale." Philip Lowe twisting and turning like the political worm he has become, 08/15/17

    I feel dirty after reading DT's tripe. Time for a shit and a shower.

  15. #75
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    DT was quoted in the daily statehouse rag today.
    Last edited by rp; 08-15-2017 at 07:39 AM.
    It's not enough to simply tolerate the 2nd Amendment as an antiquated inconvenience. Caring for the 2nd Amendment means fighting to restore long lost rights.

  16. #76
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    i must've missed your mea culpa in between all the blame cast at the lobbyists, Westinghouse, SCEG management and its shareholders.
    "JUST BECAUSE I AM NOT A GOOD SPELLER DOESN'T MEAN MY JEAN POLL IS GONNA BE BAD."
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  17. #77
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    Quote Originally Posted by Tater View Post
    NRC is the problem. Always has been, always will be.

    The US Navy has been steady building nuclear plants since the 50's without a glitch.

  18. #78
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    Quote Originally Posted by Glenn View Post
    Not to change the subject but you reminded me of one of my favorites...Rickover's Dream....
    Ephesians 2 : 8-9



    Charles Barkley: Nobody doesn't like meat.

  19. #79
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    Santee Cooper has been offloading its properties around the lake over the last two decades. There are still 172 house/lots that Santee Cooper manages but fall under ownership of the Army Corp. What happens to them? What happens to the thousands of acres of unmarked public land that surrounds the lakes that are controlled by Santee Cooper? Are they going to be sold and developed like everything else in this area has been? If Santee Cooper is sold, it will have far reaching impact on the entire state. Much larger then their share of fiscal responsibility for a failed nuclear plant.

  20. #80
    Join Date
    Nov 2001
    Location
    Green Pond SC
    Posts
    1,441

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    Great response DT-now time to do the right things for the people of South Carolina. But everybody will cover their butt and run for cover
    “The price of freedom is eternal vigilance” - Thomas Jefferson

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